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This article examines to what extent deﬂ   ation is cur-
rently a real danger for the euro area, and on that basis, 
what are the policy implications of that analysis. When it 
became clear, from September 2008, that the worsening 
ﬁ   nancial crisis would have a signiﬁ   cant impact on the 
real economy, both policy-makers and a broader public 
increasingly asked whether the economy of not just 
the euro area but also of other industrial countries was 
heading for deﬂ   ation. Parallels were repeatedly drawn 
between the current crisis and the Great Depression of 
the 1930s. Moreover, during the summer of 2009, a 
number of countries recorded negative inﬂ  ation.
This article is structured as follows. The ﬁ  rst section notes 
that deﬂ  ation is not an unknown phenomenon in eco-
nomic history, at least not when deﬁ  ned in broad terms, 
i.e. simply as the observation of negative inﬂ  ation, or a 
decline in the general price level, which amounts to the 
same thing. It also stresses the importance of distinguish-
ing between deﬂ   ationary periods on the basis of both 
the underlying shock which caused the deﬂ  ation and the 
pattern of economic activity during the various deﬂ  ation-
ary periods. In fact, the broad deﬁ  nition of deﬂ  ation, the 
original starting point, is thus modiﬁ  ed to arrive at various 
types of deﬂ  ation, namely benign deﬂ  ation, as opposed to 
various degrees of harmful deﬂ  ation. Since the term deﬂ  a-
tion often has negative connotations, it seems that benign 
forms of deﬂ  ation are generally disregarded in practice, as 
it is speciﬁ  cally the harmful forms of deﬂ  ation that present 
a serious challenge for policy. They are discussed in more 
detail in the second section of this article which, more 
speciﬁ  cally, explains why they cannot be regarded simply 
as inﬂ  ation with a negative sign. Indeed, harmful deﬂ  ation 
appears to trigger speciﬁ  c economic mechanisms which 
may lead to a downward spiral in both the price level 
and economic activity. These mechanisms are attributable 
mainly to the existence of one or other form of downward 
nominal rigidity. Section 3 assesses the risk of harmful 
deﬂ  ation in the current European context, beginning with 
an analysis of the recent trend in inﬂ  ation. Next it exam-
ines inﬂ  ation expectations – which are a key factor in the 
development of a deﬂ  ationary spiral – and then, as in the 
IMF studies, considers not only price movements them-
selves but also a broader range of indicators. Section 4 
discusses the policy options in a deﬂ  ationary environment. 
Section 5 sets out the conclusions. 
1. Deﬂ  ation, an old acquaintance
In the period since the 1970s when inﬂ  ation was a signiﬁ  -
cant destabilising factor for the economy, and monetary 
policy was aimed at controlling rising inﬂ  ation and inﬂ  a-
tion expectations, the subject of deﬂ  ation received only 
sporadic attention. However, economic history since the 
Middle Ages teaches us that deﬂ  ation has occurred fairly 
frequently, at least if it is deﬁ  ned in the broad sense – as 
already mentioned in the introduction – as the simple 
observation of falls in the general price level (negative 
inﬂ   ation). That is inextricably linked to the prevailing 
monetary policy system, because the restrictions imposed 
by monetary policy systems which were tied to stocks of 
gold and silver – as was explicitly the case at the time of 
the gold standard – were a major contributory factor in 
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CHART 1  PRICE LEVELS THROUGHOUT THE CENTURIES
  (indices 1924 = 100, logarithmic scale)
Sources : Bureau of Labor Statistics, International Institute of Social History, Office of National Statistics, Statistisches Bundesamt, NBB.
(1)  Up to 1912 this is a consumer price index for the city of Antwerp. During the two world wars no index figure was calculated.
(2)  Up to 1801 this is a consumer price index for the city of London.
Belgium (1) United Kingdom (2) United States Germany
(1)  The pattern of economic activity is in fact one of the factors identifying the 
shock. Thus, supply shocks are generally identiﬁ  ed as shocks which affect 
prices and economic activity in opposite ways, while demand shocks are usually 
identiﬁ  ed as shocks which inﬂ  uence prices and economic activity in the same 
direction.
the high frequency of falling prices. Sometimes there was 
a surge in demand for money, e.g. owing to technological 
changes or population growth, while the money supply 
was largely ﬁ  xed. Conversely, the discovery of new gold 
and silver reserves drove prices upwards. In the early 20th 
century, increasing numbers of countries abandoned 
the gold standard, so that prices rose steeply compared 
to earlier centuries. After the 1970s, monetary policy 
focused on maintaining low, stable inﬂ  ation which – at 
global level – led to a greater number of periods of nega-
tive inﬂ  ation after 1990 (Bordo and Filardo, 2005).
However, it is worth mentioning that falling prices in 
the past were not necessarily accompanied by economic 
recession. Prices often declined during periods of strong 
productivity-related growth, whereas in most cases – cer-
tainly in the light of the current severe recession worldwide – 
a link is suggested with adverse deﬂ  ationary periods such 
as the Great Depression of the 1930s or the stagnation 
in Japan during the 1990s and 2000s. In view of that 
diversity, Borio and Filardo (2004) described deﬂ  ationary 
periods as “the good, the bad and the ugly”. Deﬂ  ation is 
not an isolated phenomenon and is usually, if not always, a 
symptom of an underlying economic shock.  It is precisely 
on the basis of such underlying economic shocks (and their 
repercussions on economic activity  (1)) that a distinction can 
be made between the various types of deﬂ  ationary peri-
ods. Thus, in principle, deﬂ  ation can occur in the case of a 
positive supply shock as well as a negative demand shock.
In the ﬁ  rst case, Borio and Filardo refer to “good deﬂ  a-
tion”. This occurs if, on the one hand, a series of positive 
supply shocks expand the economic potential while, on 
the other hand, nominal demand shows little or no adjust-
ment. That is the case if the money supply does not mirror 
the expansion in the growth potential, a situation which 
often occurred in periods when the gold standard was 
in force and the global money supply therefore remained 
largely constant. The “good deﬂ  ation” label refers only 
to the beneﬁ   cial character of deﬂ   ation, and more spe-
ciﬁ  cally to the fact that the said deﬂ  ationary periods were 
not accompanied by a decline in economic activity or, on 
the contrary, were even associated with strong economic 
expansion, which is in turn attributable to the favourable 
nature of the underlying economic shock, and therefore 
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CHART 2  CONSUMER PRICES AND REAL GDP IN VOLUME IN
GERMANY
  (percentage changes compared to the corresponding period 
of the previous year)
Source : Thomson Reuters Datastream.
Consumer prices
Real GDP
cannot be interpreted in a normative way. It therefore 
does not necessarily indicate that during the said periods 
an optimum policy was implemented. In fact, it could be 
argued that the failure to accommodate favourable devel-
opments on the supply side of the economy may have 
temporarily depressed demand, and hence effective real 
growth, leading to a negative output gap during that tran-
sitional period. However, it should be pointed out that this 
theoretical argument is perhaps less relevant for the more 
distant past than today, because at that time economies 
featured less price and wage rigidity, so that – in principle – 
the monetary policy implemented had fewer real effects.
The “roaring twenties” provide an example of such 
“good deﬂ  ation”, when the post-war recovery and the 
spread of new technologies such as cars, telephones 
and radios contributed to strong real economic growth 
(White, 1990). International trade also revived, and inter-
national capital movements recovered once the leading 
exchange rates had stabilised and the gold standard was 
reintroduced in 1925. Another example of “good deﬂ  a-
tion” is the reverse oil shock in 1986, which in Germany’s 
case led to a brief period of negative inﬂ  ation with no 
noticeable adverse impact on economic activity. The fact 
that, in 1986, the reverse oil shock generated negative 
inﬂ  ation in Germany but not in most other industrialised 
countries is connected, of course, with the fact that 
inﬂ   ation in Germany was structurally lower, owing to 
the monetary policy’s strong focus on price stability. As 
already stated, this illustrates how the prevailing monetary 
policy system has an impact on the likely occurrence of 
deﬂ  ationary periods.
In this connection, reference may also be made to the rise 
of China and other new industrial countries as a signiﬁ  -
cant positive and, what is more, persistent supply shock. 
Under the gold standard, such a shock may have led to 
“good deﬂ  ation”, but since the monetary policy in most 
industrial countries is nowadays geared to stabilising inﬂ  a-
tion at a low but strictly positive level, this positive supply 
shock was largely accommodated, so that no deﬂ  ation 
was recorded ex post. This example therefore shows once 
again that the occurrence of deﬂ  ation depends on the 
prevailing monetary policy system. That also implies that, 
under the current monetary policy systems, persistent, 
good deﬂ  ation is rather unlikely.  While the gold standard, 
as already mentioned, had the inherent risk that monetary 
policy would be insufﬁ  ciently accommodating in the event 
of positive supply shocks, in retrospect it could be said 
that during the more recent period there was too much 
one-sided focus on stabilising inﬂ   ation – e.g. because 
too much importance was attached to the impact of 
ﬁ   rst round effects on inﬂ   ation resulting from cheaper 
imports from low-cost countries – so that monetary policy 
worldwide was perhaps too accommodating, thus con-
tributing to the recent boom-bust cycle.
On the other hand, “bad deﬂ  ation” results from a nega-
tive demand shock, where the contraction in activity – by 
its scale and / or persistence – exerts such great downward 
pressure on prices as to bring about a reduction in the gen-
eral price level. If that downward pressure on prices leads 
to a genuine deﬂ  ationary spiral, we call it “ugly deﬂ  ation”. 
Owing to the establishment of such a downward spiral 
– the mechanisms which trigger it will be discussed later – 
the effects on the price level and on economic activity are 
far more dramatic. Box 1 discusses the Japanese stagnation 
during the 1990s and the present decade – an example of 
“bad deﬂ  ation” – and the Great Depression in the United 
States – an example of “ugly deﬂ  ation”. It also investigates 
to what extent the current situation displays similarities 
with those periods, because in those instances, too, the 
bursting of a stock market and property market bubble 
and a malfunctioning banking system were key factors. 
However, both in Japan and during the Great Depression 
the policy responses also played a leading role (or even the 
primary role, according to some observers). Unlike during 
those periods, in the current recession the policy response 
has been resolute, and that of course considerably reduces 
the risk of bad deﬂ   ation actually occurring, even if the 
initial decline in demand is so great that, in principle, it 
implied a substantial ex ante risk of bad deﬂ  ation. 
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Box 1 –   The current crisis compared to the Great Depression and Japanese 
stagnation during the 1990s and 2000s
During the 1990s, Japanese economic activity stagnated for quite a lengthy period, while the price level exhibited 
a persistent, albeit limited, decline. However, since no deﬂ  ationary spiral occurred during that period, the Japanese 


























































































































THE CURRENT RECESSION FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Sources : Thomson Reuters Datastream, NBER Macrohistory database, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Yahoo Finance, OECD, EC.
(1)  For the United States this is the Dow Jones Industrial Average, for Japan the Nikkei 225 and for the euro area the Eurostoxx 50.
(2)  Measured as M1.
(3)  Government budget balance. For 2009 and 2010 these are EC predictions.
SHARE PRICES (1) INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION CONSUMER PRICES
MONEY SUPPLY (2)
(indices, peak industrial 
output = 100) POLICY INTEREST RATE (percent)
BUDGET BALANCE (3)
(p.c. of GDP)
Great Depression in the United States in the 1930s
Stagnation in Japan in the 1990s and 2000s
Current recession in the euro area
MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES
(indices, peak industrial production = 100)
POLICY RESPONSES
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In the United States, economic activity contracted sharply during the early 1930s, in contrast to the Japanese 
stagnation of the 1990s and 2000s, and the American price level dropped by over 25 p.c. in the space of four 
years.
There have been various theories to explain both the Japanese stagnation of the 1990s and 2000s and the Great 
Depression, and that debate is still not over today. In both cases, the bursting of a bubble on the stock market and 
the property market plus a malfunctioning banking system played a key role. Those two factors are also present 
today, so that – alongside the intensity of the current recession and the steep decline in inﬂ  ation – it is natural to 
ask whether we are moving towards bad deﬂ  ation. However, the depth of the current recession is overestimated 
in that – in the absence of GDP data for the period of the Great Depression – the chart only shows the decline in 
industrial production. Nowadays, services – which display a less marked cyclical pattern – represent a much larger 
proportion of value added and employment than in the past.
Both during the Japanese stagnation of the 1990s and 2000s and during the Great Depression, the policy responses 
played a key role, according to many researchers. The main underlying cause of the persistent economic weakness 
in Japan does not really seem to be the deﬂ  ationary process itself. Although that process has also played a role, the 
problems in the banking sector – which have dragged on for a very long time and were not resolutely addressed 
– are cited as the primary reason for the years of stagnation. During the 1990s, the Japanese government made 
only gradual attempts to stabilise the ﬁ  nancial sector, initially in the form of rather modest programmes for buying 
up bank assets, programmes which subsequently proved to be too limited and not very cohesive. In 1998, the 
government therefore also set up programmes for recapitalising troubled Japanese banks, and between 2002 and 
2004 the Bank of Japan bought shares in commercial banks, to safeguard ﬁ  nancial stability. 
On the other hand, this seems to indicate that, despite some hesitation, the monetary and ﬁ  scal  policy 
implemented did act as a stabilising factor during the Japanese stagnation of the 1990s and 2000s, as the 
(limited) price falls in Japan did not lead to any postponement of spending in the expectation of strong price 
reductions in the future (White, 2006). From 1991, the Japanese interest rate was steadily reduced, and from 
February 1999 there was a zero interest rate policy. In August 2000, however, the Bank of Japan raised its interest 
rates again, a decision which it soon had to reverse. In March 2001, it reintroduced the zero interest rate policy, 
this time in the form of a policy of quantitative easing aimed at providing the banking system with very substantial 
reserves, so that the overnight rate dropped to zero. The quantitative easing had a marked effect on the money 
supply, which increased strongly after 2001. In March 2006, the policy of quantitative easing was stopped, and in 
July 2006 the policy interest rate was again raised to 0.25 p.c. Before long, Japanese ﬁ  scal policy also provided a 
stimulus : after the 1997 recession, the budget deﬁ  cit actually rose to over 11 p.c. of GDP. The cyclically adjusted 
ﬁ  gures also indicate an expansionary policy which caused the Japanese public debt to mushroom, reaching 
180 p.c. of GDP in 2006.
In contrast, at the time of the Great Depression the inappropriate monetary policy was a crucial factor, because 
the gold standard left little room for an accommodating monetary or ﬁ  scal policy. The numerous bank runs in 
the early 1930s implied a fall in the money and credit multiplier which could not be offset by monetary policy, 
so that the money supply contracted sharply. After the United States abandoned the gold standard in March 
1933, monetary policy was eased and the money supply grew rapidly. Furthermore, the monetary expansion 
was supported by the decision, during the March 1933 Bank Holiday, to close the insolvent banks and to 
restructure others. This restored conﬁ  dence in the ﬁ  nancial system, and the process of money and credit creation 
could resume. From 1933, there was therefore a renewed increase in activity and in the price level, so that by 
1937 the Great Depression was over. The Federal Reserve also cut its ofﬁ  cial interest rates, albeit only slightly. 
Moreover, at that time those rates did not have the monetary policy signalling function that they have today. In 
contrast, American ﬁ  scal policy did not play a major role in the recovery from the Great Depression because the 
budget deﬁ  cits recorded were rather small, and were also largely offset by a more restrictive ﬁ  scal policy at local 
government level. 

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In contrast to what happened with the Japanese stagnation and the American Great Depression, the European 
monetary and ﬁ  scal authorities took swift action to deal with the steep economic decline (and the same was true 
in other industrial countries). Moreover, the rapid cuts in policy interest rates by the ECB were supplemented by 
non-conventional measures intended to maintain normal money and credit creation and thus help prevent a Great 
Depression scenario. In addition, right from the start of the crisis the national authorities set up substantial rescue 
operations to stabilise the ﬁ  nancial system and maintain conﬁ  dence, while the macroeconomic stimulus generated 
by ﬁ  scal policy was greater and more rapid than in the other two periods. Part of the reason is that, certainly in 
Europe, the automatic stabilisers are much more important now than in the past, in view of the well-developed 
social security systems. The current recession is, furthermore, a global phenomenon and for that reason central 
banks and national governments worldwide are taking measures to tackle the crisis, and some of the measures 
are being coordinated to a certain degree. Owing to political tensions between the countries concerned, there 
was no question of a more or less joint approach of this kind in the 1930s. 
2.   Why deflation is not just inflation with 
a negative sign
There are various reasons why the rest of this article 
focuses on the bad forms of deﬂ  ation. First, they could 
have disastrous consequences for economic activity and 
hence present a serious challenge for policy-makers, 
especially those in charge of monetary policy. Moreover, 
as already stated – in the light of the monetary policy sys-
tems currently prevailing in the industrial countries – there 
is now little chance of good deﬂ  ation actually occurring 
(in contrast to the 19th and the ﬁ  rst half of the 20th cen-
tury). Finally, the current crisis is to some degree compara-
ble to the situation in Japan and to the Great Depression 
of the 1930s, so that in the present circumstances bad 
deﬂ  ation is far more relevant than good deﬂ  ation.
In practice, deﬂ   ation is therefore often immediately 
deﬁ  ned as bad deﬂ  ation, and good deﬂ  ation is implicitly 
disregarded. Such a deﬁ  nition – which is narrower than 
the one used so far in this article – systematically refers 
to deﬂ  ation as a persistent fall in the general price level 
prompting expectations of further falls (Bini Smaghi, 
2008). This narrower deﬁ  nition comprises a number of 
important elements. First, it refers explicitly to a fall in 
the general price level. In practice, this means that the 
consumer price index as a whole must fall, and the price 
reductions must be widely distributed. In other words, it is 
not sufﬁ  cient to see a reduction in the price of just a few 
speciﬁ  c goods or services, because that type of price fall 
is quite common – certainly when inﬂ  ation is low – and 
is due to changes in relative demand and /or productivity, 
not developments at aggregate level. Furthermore, there 
must be a persistent price fall, not brief periods of falling 
prices, e.g. lasting a few months. Finally, a third essential 
feature is the creation of expectations of further price 
falls. The second and third features are interlinked  : the 
persistence of the price falls may help to generate further 
expectations of falling prices, which in turn encourages 
the persistence of the falls. These two elements are very 
important because they may trigger a deﬂ  ationary spiral. 
Deﬂ  ation entails ﬁ  rst of all a number of costs which also 
apply in the case of inﬂ  ation, e.g. distortion of the relative 
price signal. From that point of view, deﬂ  ation appears 
to be merely the mirror image of inﬂ  ation. However, that 
view is incorrect because it is only part of the picture  : 
deﬂ  ation also produces a number of speciﬁ  c effects which 
do not occur under inﬂ  ation, and which may entail addi-
tional and potentially high costs for the economy.  These 
effects of deﬂ  ation are also the factors which trigger a 
deﬂ   ationary spiral. There are three types of effect, and 
they are essentially attributable to one or other form of 
downward nominal rigidity (the fact that certain nominal 
variables cannot become negative or cannot fall, or at least 
display a speciﬁ  c resistance to moving in that direction). 
The lower bound of the nominal policy interest 
rate
The ﬁ  rst nominal rigidity is the zero lower bound of the 
nominal policy interest rate. This amounts to an almost 
absolute lower bound. Once the nominal interest rate 
reaches zero, the central bank can no longer ease mon-
etary policy by using the conventional interest rate instru-
ment, because everyone would rather hold cash than 
lend at a negative interest rate (liquidity trap). Although 
the monetary policy debate often focuses on the nominal 
interest rate, it is the real interest rate that inﬂ  uences the 
economy and inﬂ  ation. The real interest rate is the differ-
ence between the nominal rate – which in turn comprises 
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(1) If the deﬂ  ation is due to a positive supply shock, there is much less chance that 
such a destabilising mechanism will be triggered, because in that case it is not 
only the actual real interest rate that increases, but also its equilibrium value. That 
also makes it unlikely that what begins as good deﬂ  ation may in time turn into 
bad deﬂ  ation.
the nominal policy interest rate and the spreads consisting 
of risk and liquidity premiums – and the expected inﬂ  a-
tion. The development of negative inﬂ  ation expectations 
(expectations of price falls) is an essential feature of bad 
deﬂ   ation, in which the real interest rate may become 
increasingly positive, while the fact that the deﬂ  ation 
occurs after a strong negative demand shock speciﬁ  cally 
implies that the real natural interest rate is very low or 
even negative  (1). This difference between the real actual 
interest rate and the real natural interest rate may prolong 
the shortfall in demand in the economy, generating further 
downward pressure on prices, a further increase in nega-
tive inﬂ   ation expectations, an even higher real interest 
rate  : in short, a genuine deﬂ   ationary spiral. That spiral 
may thus develop because monetary policy has lost con-
trol over the real interest rate and is therefore no longer 
capable of steering the economy and inﬂ  ation. In more 
intuitive terms, this mechanism refers to the fact that the 
expectations of falling prices cause the postponement of 
expenditure.
If the nominal key interest rate is zero, monetary policy 
can try to continue steering the relevant real interest rate 
by reducing the spreads and  /or maintaining or creating 
positive inﬂ  ation expectations. For that purpose it is pos-
sible to pursue an unconventional monetary policy, as 
discussed in section 4. However, monetary policy-makers 
are less familiar with these alternative policy instruments, 
and apart from the possible practical implementation 
problems, their impact on the economy is harder to assess 
than that of a change in the nominal policy rate. This may 
impair the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
Japan provides a perfect example of how real inter-
est rates are affected by the zero lower bound on the 
nominal policy rate. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
the Japanese economy was bogged down in a deﬂ  a-
tionary environment, and the Japanese central bank cut 
its key interest rate to almost zero. However, since the 
deﬂ  ation had also affected expectations, the real interest 
rate remained markedly positive. This forced the Japanese 
central bank to pursue an unconventional monetary 
policy, in the form of quantitative easing. While negative 
inﬂ   ation expectations have resurfaced in Japan during 













































































CHART 3  NOMINAL AND REAL POLICY RATE
 (percentages)
Sources : Thomson Reuters Datastream, Consensus Economics.
(1)  Expected inflation for the next calendar year.
(2)  Calculated as the difference between the nominal policy rate and expected inflation.
JAPAN EURO AREA
Expected inflation (1)
Real policy rate (2)
Nominal policy rate
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(1)  In principle, this redistribution effect is no different from a sharp fall in inﬂ  ation. 
Thus, in the late 1980s and early 1990s the most severe recessions occurred 
in countries which had previously seen the biggest rise in their debts (see for 
example Groth and Westaway, 2003 and King, 1994).
(2) If  deﬂ  ation is due to a positive supply shock, then an increase in real wages is not 
necessarily a problem because their equilibrium value also rises, e.g. as a result of 
higher productivity.
(see below for more information). The result is that the 
steep cut in the ECB key interest rate has also actually 
resulted in the relaxation of monetary conditions, and the 
lower real interest rate – actually a negative real rate at 
the end of the period – can provide a signiﬁ  cant stimulus 
for economic activity.
Increase in the real burden of existing debts
Second, since most debt contracts are concluded in nomi-
nal terms, if deﬂ  ation occurs the real burden of debts pre-
viously incurred will increase. As deﬂ  ation often follows 
a period of excessive lending, this hampers the ongoing 
process of debt reduction which, ceteris paribus, further 
boosts the propensity to save and thus exacerbates the 
slump in demand. Another signiﬁ  cant consequence is an 
undesirable  ex post redistribution of wealth from bor-
rowers to savers. Since borrowers often have a greater 
propensity to consume, this redistribution also adds to 
the negative effect on demand  (1). In combination with the 
already sharply deteriorated economic conditions, there 
will also be a strong rise in repayment problems and bad 
debts. Moreover, this is often accompanied by falling asset 
prices, causing a steep decline in the value of the collat-
eral behind the loans. In such a situation, the banks will 
tighten their lending conditions, and repayment problems 
and declining collateral values will also affect the solvency 
of the ﬁ  nancial institutions, causing the crisis to become 
even more acute. The pursuit of price stability and avoid-
ance of deﬂ  ation are therefore crucial from the point of 
view of ﬁ  nancial stability, too. 
Downward nominal wage rigidity
A third important downward nominal rigidity concerns 
the difﬁ  culty of reducing nominal wages, even if such a 
move would be justiﬁ  ed on the grounds of the deterio-
rating economic situation or the decline in the general 
price level. The reason lies in the “money illusion” of the 
economic agents, whereby they focus mainly on nominal 
wages rather than real wages, and consequently always 
see a reduction in wages as a loss of purchasing power – 
even if that is not the case.
In the short term, a relatively high degree of downward 
nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) may be favourable, because 
it supports real disposable incomes (and hence demand in 
the economy), and in the ﬁ  rst instance eases the problem 
of repaying loans. In the early stages, this can counter-
balance deﬂ   ationary pressure. However, rigidities also 
hamper the adjustment of the real economy, certainly if 
the downward shock is persistent. In the end, as a result 
of a non-adjusted high real wage level, this puts further 
pressure on business proﬁ  tability, leading to higher unem-
ployment and therefore exacerbating the impact of the 
demand shock  (2).This seems to imply that, in view of the 
higher degree of rigidity, the euro area is better protected 
initially against the emergence of deﬂ  ation  than  the 
United States, but once a deﬂ  ationary process has started, 
the euro area would be harder hit. In this connection, 
however, De Grauwe (2009) comments that some speciﬁ  c 
characteristics of ‘rigid’ economies, such as the existence 
of an extensive social security system or minimum wages, 
may halt the deﬂ   ationary mechanism, because despite 
falling to some degree, disposable incomes will not drop 
below a certain level, so that consumption and debt 
repayment are still supported. According to this reasoning, 
any negative effects of greater rigidity are thus absorbed 
by ﬁ  scal policy, and more speciﬁ  cally by the ‘automatic 
stabilisers’ which are more signiﬁ  cant in Europe than in 
the United States and the cost which this implies for the 
government would be less than the expense which the 
government would face in a decidedly deﬂ  ationary envi-
ronment. However, it must be added that the ﬁ  scal scope 
available to the government, and therefore its potential for 
stabilising the economy, is not unlimited.
The relevance of DNWR varies greatly from one country 
to another, depending on the institutional characteristics 
of the labour market. For instance, in Portugal, nominal 
wage reductions are prohibited by law, so that there is a 
high degree of downward nominal wage rigidity (Duarte, 
2008). In contrast, Belgium has hardly any DNWR owing 
to automatic wage indexation, because in the event of 
negative inﬂ  ation, indexation will imply downward adjust-
ments in nominal wages. This protects real wages from 
any upward effect caused by deﬂ  ation, so that the real 
consequences are less disastrous for Belgian businesses 
and hence also for unemployment. Moreover, the exist-
ence of DNWR in the trading partners may ultimately 
lead to an improvement in Belgium’s competitive position 
in an international deﬂ  ationary environment, though on 
the other hand, indexation accelerates the nominal effect 
on wages and prices, so that Belgium may suffer more 
acutely from the problem of the real interest rate and 
the increase in the debt burden explained above. Yet in a 
small, open economy such as Belgium, the absence of an 
effect on real wages is perhaps more important than the 
fact that there may be a bigger effect on the real interest 
rate or the debt burden. While indexation in Belgium may 
thus attenuate the effects of deﬂ  ation, in other instances 
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– such as terms of trade shocks – that mechanism has the 
drawback of hampering the adjustment of the economy 
precisely because the required adjustment to real wages 
is more difﬁ  cult to achieve. Indeed,  Du Caju et al. (2007) 
ﬁ  nd that Belgium features a low degree of nominal wage 
rigidity but a high degree of real wage rigidity.
In countries without wage indexation, the impact of 
DNWR increases, in principle, the lower the level of inﬂ  a-
tion.  Of course, that phenomenon will be more plainly 
visible in a deﬂ  ationary environment. For example, Fehr 
and Goette (2005) show that the decline in inﬂ  ation in 
Switzerland, from 4.7 p.c. in 1991 to 0 p.c. in 1997, 
was accompanied by a distortion in the distribution 
of the wage changes recorded in the individual data. 
The histogram for 1997 was less symmetrical than the 
one for 1991, and the distortion lay in the fact that 
in 1997 fewer downward adjustments to real wages 
were recorded than in 1991, precisely because there 
was a substantial rise in the percentage of wages that 
remained unchanged (and thus evidently could not be 
adjusted downwards), from less than 5 p.c. in 1991 to 
almost 20 p.c. in 1997. Such an increase in the percent-
age of unchanged wages is a typical symptom of DNWR. 
Yet it is also evident that DNWR is not an absolute given 
in Switzerland, since there was also a considerable 
increase in the proportion of wage reductions between 
1991 and 1997 (from 11 p.c. in 1991 to 31 p.c. in 
1997). In Hong Kong, a country where the institutional 
characteristics of the labour market are admittedly very 
different from those of the euro area, the consumer price 
index declined between May 1998 and August 2003 by 
a cumulative total of 16.3 p.c., and during that period 
wage reductions were frequently observed. Furthermore, 
the distribution of wage adjustments was symmetrical 
during that period (Gerlach, 2009). The degree to which 
the DNWR problem would manifest itself in a deﬂ  a-
tionary environment therefore appears to be an open 
question. 
3.   The risk of deﬂ  ation in the current 
context
In order to assess the risks of deﬂ  ation in the current con-
text, the analysis focuses not only on the recent pattern of 
inﬂ  ation but also on the inﬂ  ation expectations of various 
economic agents at different horizons. Since the deﬂ  ation 
risks cannot be viewed separately from the underlying 
negative demand shock, a wide range of indicators is then 
taken into account alongside inﬂ  ation measures.
Are the price falls widespread at present ?
The global inﬂ  ation picture currently features a process 
of disinﬂ  ation (in many cases even negative inﬂ  ation) as 
a result of the sharp fall in energy and food prices since 
the summer of 2008. Before that, energy prices – and to 
a lesser extent food prices – had given a strong boost to 
inﬂ  ation, which thus reached its highest level for decades 
in the various developed economies. In contrast, core 
inﬂ  ation, deﬁ  ned as total inﬂ  ation excluding energy and 
food, is only declining slowly in both the euro area and 
in many other industrialised economies. In Belgium, the 
turning point in core inﬂ   ation was reached somewhat 
later as the high indexations of 2008 and early 2009 were 
still exerting upward pressure.
This implies that the contraction of activity and, in gen-
eral, weak demand have not (yet) had a major effect on 
prices of non-energy and non-food goods and services in 
the euro area, and especially not in Belgium. This means 
that the rapid decline in inﬂ  ation  observed  in  recent 
months is not so much an indication of a fall in the gen-
eral price level but rather the outcome of relative price 
movements. Viewed in that way, the current decline in 
inﬂ  ation looks similar to the period of “good deﬂ  ation” in 
Germany following the reverse oil shock in 1986. Precisely 
because the decline in inﬂ  ation is attributable to imported 
goods, it supports purchasing power in the industrial 
countries via the accompanying improvement in the terms 
of trade, and counteracts the negative forces in the real 
economy. This can hardly be seen as a mechanism trigger-
ing a harmful deﬂ  ationary spiral, unless the sharp fall in 
inﬂ  ation is incorporated in inﬂ  ation expectations.
The fact that the price falls are not as yet widespread is 
also evident from a ‘diffusion index’ which shows the per-
centage of product categories in the harmonised index of 
consumer prices which record a year-on-year fall in price. 
It is apparent from this criterion that price reductions are 
not exceptional, certainly not in sectors exhibiting major 
productivity gains such as communication services or 
multimedia products. It is also evident that this index has 
not increased exceptionally strongly during the recent 
period, conﬁ  rming that there is no evidence of a general 
tendency towards falling prices, either in the euro area or 
in Belgium. That ﬁ  nding holds regardless of whether or 
not the HICP weights are applied to the diffusion index. 
For Belgium, the Institute of National Accounts (2009) 
reached similar ﬁ  ndings on the basis of individual price 
notations which form the basis of the consumer price 
index.


















































































































































































































CHART 4  HARMONISED INDEX OF CONSUMER PRICES
Sources : EC, NBB.
(1)  HICP excluding energy and food.
(2)  Share of product categories with price falls in the total.
(3)  Weighted with the HICP weights.
(4)  Cumulative base effects since January 2008, calculated as the contribution to the change in inflation in a particular month attributable to marked movements in the 
corresponding month of the previous year. For that purpose, the month-on-month change in the HICP was compared with the usual pattern of change for each month. 





TOTAL AND UNDERLYING INFLATION (1)
(percentage changes compared to the previous year)
IMPORTANCE OF PRICE FALLS (2)
(diffusion indices, percentages)
SIZE OF BASE EFFECTS (4)
Base effects for non-energy goods and services (percentage points, right-hand scale)
Base effects for energy (percentage points, right-hand scale)
Unweighted diffusion index
Annual inflation (percentages, left-hand scale)
Weighted diffusion index (3)
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(1)  A base effect refers to the inﬂ  uence – on a particular month’s inﬂ  ation ﬁ  gure – 
of an unusual or extreme development during the base period, namely in the 
corresponding month of the previous year. The impact of base effects was 
quantiﬁ  ed as the contribution to the change in inﬂ  ation originating from a 
deviation in the month-on-month change in the base period compared to the 
usual pattern of change. Those monthly effects were then cumulated from 
January 2008.
As a result of the steep rises in energy and food prices in 
the ﬁ  rst half of 2008, base effects  (1) exerted strong down-
ward pressure on inﬂ  ation during the ﬁ  rst half of 2009. In 
June and July, the impact of the downward base effects 
showed a further slight increase  ; those were the very 
months in which inﬂ  ation peaked in 2008. In Belgium, 
base effects are more marked than in the euro area, 
owing to the much stronger surge in Belgian inﬂ  ation in 
2008. In August 2009, however, the downward impact of 
the base effects started to weaken so that, ceteris pari-
bus, the downward trend in inﬂ  ation should be reversed. 
However, it is uncertain whether that will actually happen, 
and if so, to what extent, because in the months ahead 
inﬂ  ation will be determined not only by the mechanical 
impact of these base effects but also by the movement 
in prices during those actual months, which will in turn 
depend in particular on the movement in commodity 
prices and the pressure on prices caused by the general 
economic situation.
Will the price falls persist for long ?
Inﬂ  ation expectations play a crucial role in determining 
current inﬂ  ation, and are therefore important for assess-
ing the possible risks of deﬂ  ation now and in the near 
future. They are also important as a determinant of the 
monetary policy stance, and – in the case of a very low 
nominal policy interest rate – inﬂ  uencing inﬂ  ation expec-
tations becomes the principal if not the only instrument 
left for inﬂ  uencing the real interest rate (see above). It is 
therefore very important to conduct a close analysis of the 
pattern of inﬂ  ation expectations.
The European Commission’s monthly consumer survey 
asks a question about the expected movement in con-
sumer prices over the coming twelve months, compared 
to that during the past twelve months. This balance sta-
tistic is converted to an inﬂ  ation indicator comparable to 
the HICP via a standardisation procedure. This shows that 
both in the euro area and in Belgium this expected inﬂ  a-
tion based on the balance statistic has fallen sharply since 
mid 2008, and has become slightly negative in recent 
months. That movement tallies with what other sources 
predict and thus conﬁ  rms the information value of this 
– albeit qualitative – criterion.
When analysing deﬂ  ation risk, it is interesting to examine 
what proportion of consumers claim to expect a fall in 
consumer prices. In the past, that ﬁ   gure was negligi-
ble, except for a small rise in the Netherlands in 2003, 
when that country was affected by a contraction in 
activity accompanied by a price war in the distribution 
sector. Recently it has become apparent that a growing 
proportion of consumers in various euro area countries 
are expecting prices to fall, but the percentage is still 
rather low overall.
Since September 2008, inﬂ  ation predictions for the euro 
area produced by international institutions and other 
professional forecasters have undergone sharp down-
ward revision. That is particularly true for 2009, and to a 
lesser extent for 2010, indicating that these forecasters 
are assuming that inﬂ  ation will pick up again to some 
extent compared to the low level expected in 2009. That 
view corresponds to the diminishing downward impact 
of base effects explained above. Nonetheless, the latest 
predictions for 2010 are well below the upper limit of the 
quantitative deﬁ  nition of price stability applied by the ECB 
Governing Council. Yet all forecasters still expect positive 
inﬂ  ation in 2010. At the same time, however, the uncer-
tainty has greatly increased. That is evident from the fact 
that the dispersion of the forecasts for 2010 produced 
during the ﬁ   rst half of 2009 is greater than for those 
produced for 2009 in the ﬁ  rst half of 2008. Since the pre-
diction horizon is the same in both cases, that increased 
dispersion has nothing to do with technical factors but 
deﬁ   nitely indicates greater intrinsic uncertainty for the 
latest exercises. The OECD and IMF inﬂ  ation forecasts, in 
particular, are much lower than the others.
Another important source for measuring inﬂ  ation expec-
tations in the euro area is the ECB’s quarterly survey of 
professional forecasters. The added value of this survey is 
not only the large number of participants – between forty 
and sixty – but also the fact that, as well as making fore-
casts for the current and the next calendar year, they also 
provide information on inﬂ  ation expectations within one, 
two and ﬁ  ve years respectively. This last item of informa-
tion is very important because it concerns long-term inﬂ  a-
tion expectations and therefore offers an indication of the 
credibility of monetary policy. These data again show that 
the professional forecasters have adjusted their expecta-
tions downwards since September 2008, but that adjust-
ment declines with the prediction horizon. According to 
the latest survey, the average inﬂ  ation forecast within one 
year (actually June 2010) is 1.2 p.c., the average inﬂ  ation 
forecast within two years (actually June 2011) is 1.6 p.c. 
and the average inﬂ   ation forecast within ﬁ   ve years is 
2.0 p.c. Although the long-term inﬂ  ation expectation is 
thus still anchored at a level corresponding to the quanti-
tative deﬁ  nition of price stability, it is nevertheless evident 
from the data that the downward deviation from the 












































































































































































































CHART 5  SHORT-TERM INFLATION EXPECTATIONS
Sources : Consensus Economics, EC, ECB, IMF, OECD, NBB.
(1)  Balance of responses to the EC survey, converted to an inflation indicator comparable to the HICP using the standardisation procedure described in Aucremanne, L., 













CONSUMERS’ INFLATION EXPECTATIONS OVER THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS
EXPECTED INFLATION (1)
(percentage changes compared to the corresponding month 
of the previous year)
EXPECTATIONS OF PRICE FALLS
(in percentages of the total number of responses)
INFLATION FORECASTS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROFESSIONAL FORECASTERS FOR THE EURO AREA
(percentage changes compared to the previous calendar year)
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long-term inﬂ  ation expectation is assumed to be some-
what persistent (at least until 2011).
Inﬂ  ation expectations can also be deduced from ﬁ  nancial 
market instruments such as indexed bonds and inﬂ  ation 
swaps, but these measures have to be interpreted with 
some caution in times of heightened ﬁ  nancial  market 
volatility. However, that proviso applies less to inﬂ  ation 
swaps than to the inﬂ  ation expectations deduced from 
indexed bonds (NBB, 2009), so that the analysis which fol-
lows is based on the former. From the spot price of inﬂ  a-
tion swaps it is possible to calculate implicit forward prices 
for one-year inﬂ   ation swaps, the latter reﬂ  ecting  the 
expected HICP inﬂ  ation for the ensuing year for various 
points in time  (1). The advantage of these implicit forward 
prices is that, in contrast to the survey of professional 
forecasters, they also provide information for intermediate 
horizons, namely not only within one, two and ﬁ  ve years 
but also within three and four years. Thus, in September 
2008,  the expected inﬂ  ation for June was priced at 2 p.c. 
for 2009 and roughly 2.5 p.c. for subsequent years, a 
level which is not necessarily contrary to the deﬁ  nition of 
price stability since inﬂ  ation swaps incorporate not only 
the actual inﬂ  ation expectation but also quite consider-
able risk and liquidity premiums. Since September 2008, 
however, inﬂ  ation expectations for the coming ﬁ  ve to six 
years have shifted downwards, primarily – though not 
exclusively – for the shorter horizons. On the basis of the 
August 2009 inﬂ  ation swaps, the ﬁ  nancial markets do not 
expect any negative inﬂ  ation or deﬂ  ation, but anticipate 
only a gradual return to inﬂ  ation at levels corresponding 
to price stability. Nonetheless, it is also apparent that the 
long-term expectations are still ﬁ   rmly anchored. In the 
event of a longer period of downward deviations from 
the quantitative deﬁ  nition of price stability, there is a risk 
that economic agents will gradually adjust downwards 
their perception of the Eurosystem’s inﬂ  ation objective. If 
that should happen, then there will of course be a greater 
risk of deﬂ  ation.
This was also reﬂ   ected in the Eurosystem’s September 
2009 inﬂ   ation projections. Those projections form part 
of a coherent macroeconomic exercise and therefore 
take account of the outlook for the real economy  (2). For 
the euro area, inﬂ  ation has become negative during the 
summer, mainly as a result of base effects. However, it 
is likely to gather pace again thereafter. For 2010, inﬂ  a-
tion is expected to run at between 0.8 and 1.6 p.c. That 
assumes that, in view of the disappearance of the nega-
tive contribution from energy, core inﬂ  ation will decline 
further. On the basis of the centre point of the published 
intervals, it therefore seems that, in the baseline scenario, 
although inﬂ  ation in 2010 will be well below the 2 p.c. 
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CHART 6  LONGER-TERM INFLATION EXPECTATIONS FOR 
THE EURO AREA
  (percentage changes compared to the corresponding month of 
the previous year)
Sources : Bloomberg, EC, ECB.
(1)  Implicit forward price for a one-year inflation swap.
HICP
One-year forward inflation-linked swap rates (1) 
(August 2009)
ECB survey of professional forecasters (August 2009)
Inflation expectations during the third quarter of 2009
Inflation expectations before the intensification of 
the financial crisis
One-year forward inflation-linked swap rates (1) 
(September 2008)
ECB survey of professional forecasters (August 2008)
inﬂ  ation is unlikely. However, the uncertainty interval indi-
cates that the ﬁ  gure could be lower or higher. A steeper 
decline in economic activity and /or a slower recovery than 
assumed in the September 2009 projections could lead to 
lower inﬂ  ation. Higher commodity prices – the September 
projection was based in particular on an average crude 
oil price of 62.4 and 78.9 dollars per barrel of Brent in 
2009 and 2010 respectively – and /or a speedier economic 
recovery could lead to higher inﬂ  ation.
In qualitative terms, the inﬂ  ation projection for Belgium 
published by the Bank in June 2009 differs little from this 
pattern. A brief period of negative inﬂ  ation during May to 
October 2009 will be followed by a slight rise in inﬂ  ation 
(1)  Since the consumer price index is published after a certain delay, the inﬂ  ation 
swap contracts reﬂ  ect expected inﬂ  ation for the month three months ahead 
of the due date of the inﬂ  ation swap. Thus, the August 2009 contracts reﬂ  ect 
expected inﬂ  ation for the month of May, while the September 2008 contracts 
reﬂ  ect the expected inﬂ  ation for the month of June.
(2)  They are also based on market expectations regarding short- and long-term 
interest rates and on implicit crude oil prices as indicated by forward contracts, 
while the bilateral exchange rates were kept constant at their mid August value.
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(1)  See also Gerlach (2009).
(2)  In the IMF’s original methodology, some responses were weighted on the basis of 
the relative size of the stock market and the bank lending market. That is not the 
case in our own calculations. Small deviations from results previously published by 
the IMF may also be attributable to the use of different data banks and / or data 
revisions. The data used for this article are quarterly ﬁ  gures.
Box 2 –   Measuring the deﬂ  ationary risk according to the IMF methodology
The IMF synthetic indicator for deﬂ  ation risk comprises eleven indicators and the associated threshold values which 
are listed below. They can be divided into four categories. First, three general inﬂ  ation criteria are considered, 
because low inﬂ  ation is logically regarded as potentially problematic. Since bad deﬂ  ation is associated with a 
negative demand shock, a series of variables was also selected which focus on the scale of the demand shock, 
and more speciﬁ  cally on the degree to which there is excess capacity in the economy. The trend in asset prices also 
functions as an indicator, as some periods of bad deﬂ  ation are not only preceded by a boom-bust cycle in asset 
prices but the movement in asset prices – via income and wealth effects – has a signiﬁ  cant impact on the negative 
demand shock, which it may or may not reinforce. Finally, four indicators focus on aspects of monetary conditions, 
precisely because it is evident from the foregoing that monetary policy plays a key role in the occurrence or 
avoidance of deﬂ  ation.

to an average of 1.3 p.c. in 2010. The fact that inﬂ  ation 
in 2009 (average 0.1 p.c.) will be slightly below the ﬁ  gure 
for the euro area is the net outcome of a stronger down-
ward effect for energy – Belgian inﬂ  ation is traditionally 
more sensitive to this factor – and the fact that the mod-
eration of underlying inﬂ  ation is initially slower than in the 
euro area, suggesting the presence of some second round 
effects due to the very high inﬂ  ation in 2008. However, 
the impact of this last factor will gradually ebb away, and 
in 2010 wage indexation will actually become a factor 
contributing to wage moderation. Of course, the inﬂ  ation 
projection for Belgium is also uncertain, and that uncer-
tainty is actually greater than for the euro area, since the 
movement in the crude oil price has a greater inﬂ  uence 
on Belgian inﬂ  ation.
A broader approach to the risk of deﬂ  ation : the 
IMF methodology
While this section has so far focused on inﬂ  ation itself 
and on inﬂ   ation expectations, it is also important to 
consider a broader set of economic variables in order to 
identify potential deﬂ   ationary risks, because deﬂ  ation 
is not a phenomenon expressed purely in price move-
ments. As already stated, it is a macroeconomic phenom-
enon with clear interactions between prices and activity. 
Furthermore, in the past it has been evident that deﬂ  ation 
is very difﬁ  cult to predict, one reason being that price and 
wage rigidities initially inhibit a sharp decline in (core) 
inﬂ   ation, and that may conceal substantial downward 
pressure on prices exerted by a low capacity utilisation 
rate. Finally, indicators of inﬂ  ation expectations need to be 
interpreted with due caution, as they are based not only 
on the expected impact of economic shocks but also on 
the expected monetary policy response  (1). If the economic 
agents assume that the authorities will do everything pos-
sible to avoid deﬂ  ation, inﬂ  ation expectations will remain 
largely stable, certainly in the long term, but that does 
not of course imply that the policy should remain neutral.
A broader approach is therefore required. For that pur-
pose, the IMF has developed a methodology aimed at 
proposing a wide range of relevant variables in synthetic 
form. The result is known as the IMF “deﬂ  ation vulnera-
bility indicator” (see IMF, 2003 and Decressin and Laxton, 
2009). Here, the IMF selected eleven variables which are 
relevant for detecting deﬂ  ation risks. A threshold value 
is associated with each variable. If a variable is below its 
threshold value, it is assigned the binary value 1, which 
indicates an increased risk of deﬂ   ation  ; otherwise it is 
assigned the binary value 0. The average of these binary 
scores yields a standardised indicator with values ranging 
between 0 and 1. A high (low) value for this synthetic 
indicator indicates a high (low) risk of deﬂ  ation. In view of 
its composition, however, this indicator cannot be inter-
preted as a percentage risk of deﬂ  ation. For this article, it 
was possible to calculate a synthetic indicator up to the 
second quarter of 2009  (2). Box 2 lists the eleven selected 
variables and their threshold values. 
As expected, the value of the indicator for Japan is high 
throughout the period considered. An increased risk was 
also identiﬁ  ed for some countries at the end of 2002 and 
in 2003. During that period, it was mainly Switzerland 
and the euro area that had an increased risk of deﬂ  ation.   
At the time, the IMF (2003) mainly drew attention to a 
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When interpreting this indicator, it should be borne in mind that (in the absence of comparable criteria for the 
various countries) no account is taken of inﬂ  ation expectations, and excess capacity is very difﬁ  cult to measure 
accurately, certainly in real time. Finally, determination of the threshold value for each partial indicator is not 
obvious. Owing to the limited number of recent periods of deﬂ  ation, those threshold values were based mainly 
on Japan’s experience during the 1990s. It is therefore not surprising that the indicator for Japan points to an 
increased deﬂ  ation risk towards the end of the 1990s and in the initial years of the present decade.
THE ELEVEN QUESTIONS IN THE SYNTHETIC IMF INDICATOR OF THE DEFLATION RISK
 
  Inﬂation criteria
Is total annual inﬂation below 0.5 p.c.  ?
Has the GDP deﬂator risen by less than 0.5 p.c. in the past year  ?
Is annual core inﬂation below 0.5 p.c.  ?
  Capacity utilisation
Has the output gap shrunk by more than 2 percentage points over the past four quarters  ?
Is the output gap less than 2 p.c.  ?
Is the average real GDP growth over the past three years below two-thirds of the average real GDP growth over the 
preceding ten years  ?
  Asset prices
Have share prices dropped by more than 30 p.c. over the past three years  ?
  Monetary conditions
Has the real effective exchange rate appreciated by more than 4 p.c. over the past year  ?
Is annual credit growth lower than nominal GDP growth  ?
Is cumulative credit growth over the past three years below 10 p.c.  ?
Has broad money grown by 2 percentage points less than base money over the past two years  ?
 
heightened deﬂ   ation risk in Germany. Conversely, the 
indicator for the United States is surprisingly low in 2002-
2003. This last ﬁ  nding, which is admittedly based on a 
rather rudimentary indicator, is in line with the ﬁ  ndings of 
other studies which indicate that US monetary policy may 
have overestimated the deﬂ  ation risk at that time, and 
was therefore too accommodating. Taylor (2009) argues 
that monetary policy was too lax in the period 2002-
2004, and Jarocinsky and Smets (2008) conclude that this 
lax monetary policy contributed to the asset price boom 
in the United States.
For the recent period, the deﬂ  ation risk seems to have 
increased considerably in virtually all the industrialised 
economies, both in the last quarter of 2008 and in the 
ﬁ  rst and second quarter of 2009. The deﬂ  ation risk seems 
to be particularly great in Japan and Switzerland. In the 
euro area and the US, it is quite considerable and clearly 
greater than in the period 2002-2003.
The fact that this indicator unmistakeably points to an 
increased deﬂ  ation risk is not inconsistent with the mon-
etary policy stance adopted in the countries mentioned 
since September 2008. Owing to the sharp decline in 
inﬂ  ationary pressure (and the potential threat of deﬂ  a-
tion), key interest rates in all these economies were cut at 
an unprecedented speed, and the expansionary monetary 
policy was further backed by non-conventional measures. 
The contradiction between the increased deﬂ  ation  risk 
according to the IMF methodology and the earlier ﬁ  ndings 
whereby many other indicators suggest only a limited risk 
is merely an illusion. This paradox can be explained as fol-
lows. The prevailing inﬂ  ation expectations and forecasts 
embody not only the expected impact of the economic 
shocks but also the strong monetary policy response, and 
in many cases also the (implicit) expectation of additional 
measures if the deﬂ  ationary pressure should nevertheless 
manifest itself. Precisely because of this reliance on the 
stabilising role of policy, the eventual ex post risk is there-
fore signiﬁ  cantly smaller than the ex ante risk of deﬂ  ation. 
The IMF indicator perhaps comes closer to measuring 




































CHART 7  SYNTHETIC INDICATOR OF THE DEFLATION RISK 
ACCORDING TO THE IMF METHODOLOGY (1)
  (average of the binary scores for the eleven indicators)
Sources : IMF, NBB.






this ex ante risk. That should encourage policy-makers to 
remain constantly vigilant, and if necessary to take appro-
priate, resolute action. The policy options in the case of an 
increased risk of deﬂ  ation, or if deﬂ  ation has already set 
in, are discussed in the next section of this article.
4.   Policy options in a deﬂ  ationary 
environment
This article has already drawn attention to the crucial role 
of monetary policy, in particular, in determining whether 
or not deﬂ  ation occurs. Economists in general agree that 
economic policy – be it monetary or ﬁ   scal policy, or a 
combination of the two – is always capable of generating 
inﬂ  ation (Bernanke, 2002), so that persistent deﬂ  ation can 
ultimately be viewed as either a policy choice or a policy fail-
ure  (Buiter, 2003). This section discusses the various policy 
options, with reference to examples from the recent past.
Prevention is better than cure
Since, as mentioned above, deﬂ  ation may be accompa-
nied by a number of reinforcing mechanisms which do 
not apply in the case of inﬂ  ation, it is far more difﬁ  cult 
to revive a deﬂ  ationary economy than to curb inﬂ  ationary 
tensions in an overheated economy. Prevention is there-
fore better than cure, certainly where deﬂ  ation is con-
cerned. 
Even in times when deﬂ  ation does not appear to be an 
immediate problem, it is possible, when determining the 
monetary policy strategy, to do something to ward off 
deﬂ  ation by creating a kind of buffer zone against deﬂ  a-
tion risks. That is why central banks typically deﬁ  ne price 
stability as low but strictly positive inﬂ  ation. For instance, 
in the euro area the ECB Governing Council has, since 
2003, deﬁ  ned price stability as an annual rise in the HICP 
for the euro area of less than – but close to – 2 p.c. in the 
medium term. When the deﬁ  nition was clariﬁ  ed by adding   
“but close to” in May 2003, that was an explicit reference 
to the risks of deﬂ   ation. This buffer zone reduces the 
likelihood of the key interest rate reaching the lower limit 
in the event of a substantial negative demand shock. This 
last argument was precisely one of the elements expressly 
taken into account in determining the buffer zone for the 
euro area (Coenen, 2003), because the risk of the key 
interest rate encountering the lower limit appeared to 
increase in a non-linear way for inﬂ  ation objectives below 
2 p.c. Of course, the advantage of creating such a buffer 
zone has to be weighed against the possible costs of posi-
tive inﬂ  ation in normal circumstances. Other central banks 
with an explicit inﬂ  ation objective have typically set theirs 
at between 1 and 3 p.c.
Furthermore, a quantitative inﬂ  ation objective offers a clear 
reference point for inﬂ  ation expectations, so that they can 
be more ﬁ   rmly anchored, reducing the risk of a deﬂ  a-
tionary spiral. Central banks which, like the Eurosystem, 
have an explicit inﬂ   ation objective are therefore better 
equipped, in principle, for the battle against deﬂ  ation than 
central banks with no explicit inﬂ  ation objective.
This also implies that if inﬂ  ation and inﬂ  ation expectations 
fall below the threshold associated with price stability, 
that may prompt an adjustment of the monetary policy 
stance in exactly the same way as if they exceed it. Such 
a symmetrical approach to achieving price stability – as 
there are not only upside but also downside risks to price 
stability – is best emphasised from the start and system-
atically applied in order to ensure that it is sufﬁ  ciently 
credible when a real risk of deﬂ  ation arises.
If, in the event of a sudden, sharp deterioration in the 
economic fundamentals, a real deﬂ   ation risk neverthe-
less looms, it is best for monetary policy to be proactive 
– i.e. to produce a stronger response than under normal 
circumstances – by making speedy and signiﬁ  cant  cuts 
in the key interest rate (see Ito, 2009 and Orphanides, 
2009). If this causes the nominal interest rate to fall faster 
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instrument, namely the short-term interest rate, to other 
aspects of monetary policy such as the quantity of base 
money, the size and structure of the central bank bal-
ance sheet, and the steering of longer-term interest rates. 
However, it must be noted that not all of the recent addi-
tional measures were expressly related to the risk of deﬂ  a-
tion, as such a link is less evident for measures in the ﬁ  rst 
and second category. Nevertheless, they also contribute, 
at least indirectly, towards reducing the risks of deﬂ  ation.
Apart from monetary policy, ﬁ  scal policy can also help to 
limit deﬂ  ationary risks. If deﬂ  ationary periods are accom-
panied by risks to ﬁ  nancial stability – which is often the 
case – it is crucial to tackle the banks’ solvency problems 
without delay. One of the lessons which can be drawn 
from the Japanese stagnation in the 1990s and 2000s 
is that hesitation in that respect prolongs the crisis. In 
addition, ﬁ  scal policy can provide macroeconomic stimuli, 
either via the automatic stabilisers or via additional dis-
cretionary action plans. For the ﬁ  scal policy to succeed, 
it must focus as far as possible on measures with the 
biggest multiplier. Moreover, it is also necessary to ensure 
that public ﬁ   nances are sustainable in the long term, 
otherwise there will be Ricardian effects which impair 
the efﬁ  ciency of ﬁ  scal policy. This policy therefore cannot 
be implemented without constraints. The ﬁ  scal  policy 
adopted in the EU Member States and in the United 
States is discussed in detail in another article in this issue 
of the Economic Review.
Since deﬂ  ation often sets in totally unexpectedly and it 
is not easy to distinguish between, on the one hand, a 
sharp growth slowdown or recession forming part of a 
more or less normal, albeit very pronounced, economic 
cycle and, on the other hand, a recession which may 
trigger a deﬂ  ationary spiral, policy in practice faces the 
difﬁ  cult challenge of correctly assessing the situation at 
a very early stage in “real time” – i.e. on the basis of the 
data available at the time of the policy decision – and then 
implementing the appropriate policy response. In view 
of this real time character of the decisions, both type 1 
and type 2 type errors (terms borrowed from statistics) 
can be made. In this context, a type 1 error occurs if the 
policy is not aimed at avoiding deﬂ  ation, whereas there 
is a real danger of deﬂ  ation. In that case, it is very likely 
that deﬂ  ation will actually occur as a result of the under-
estimation of the deﬂ  ation risk and the inadequate policy 
response. A type 2 error consists in conducting a decid-
edly anti-deﬂ  ationary policy whereas in reality there is no 
real risk of deﬂ  ation. The result in that case will be that 
than inﬂ  ation expectations, monetary policy can remain 
sufﬁ  ciently expansionary by cutting the real interest rate, 
which in those circumstances has a stabilising effect on 
the economy, ultimately counteracting the decline in 
inﬂ  ation expectations and reducing the risk that the key 
interest rate will actually come up against the lower limit. 
The existence of a lower limit for the key interest rate 
therefore implies that more aggressive use is made of 
the interest rate instrument than in a (hypothetical) situ-
ation without a lower limit (Adam and Billi, 2006), and 
that hesitation in using the interest rate instrument, e.g. 
in order to retain the option of further cuts later on, is 
certainly not to be recommended in those circumstances.
In regard to the lower limit, it must be said that in theory 
the limit is zero, but in practice allowance must be made 
for the fact that a very low interest rate can be damaging 
to the proﬁ  tability of banks and other ﬁ  nancial institu-
tions, with implications for the transmission of the mon-
etary policy impulse and for ﬁ  nancial stability. One of the 
factors at work here is that the banks pay rates which are 
below the key interest rate on their customers’ deposits. 
Once those interest rates have reached zero – i.e. before 
the key policy rate does so – if the monetary policy is 
eased further, that either squeezes the banks’ interest 
rate margin or means that the additional monetary policy 
impulse is no longer passed on in full in lending rates.   
The consequences have to be weighed against the fact 
that a further easing, via the improvement in the macro-
economic situation which in principle results, generates 
positive feedback effects on the proﬁ  tability of the ﬁ  nan-
cial sector. In practice, central banks seem to adopt very 
low but nonetheless strictly positive key interest rates in 
exceptional circumstances  (1).
In addition to cutting the key interest rate, central banks 
can also take unconventional monetary policy measures, 
as they have done in the past few months. The recent 
unconventional monetary policy measures were taken for 
three reasons, which will be brieﬂ  y explained below. First, 
additional liquidity was provided in order to ensure ﬁ  nan-
cial stability, in other words, central banks have deﬁ  nitely 
fulﬁ  lled their role as lender of last resort during the ﬁ  nan-
cial crisis. Second, some of these measures were aimed at 
restoring the smooth operation of the money market, the 
interbank market and other segments of the credit mar-
kets, so that the monetary transmission mechanism could 
continue to work as efﬁ  ciently as possible. Third, certain 
measures were motivated by the fact that in some econo-
mies the key interest rate had been reduced very close 
to the absolute lower limit. For, once that rate reaches 
its lower limit, monetary policy is not powerless against 
persistent deﬂ   ationary pressure. In such circumstances,
 the focus of monetary policy may shift from the traditional 
(1)  An exeption in this respect is the Swedish central bank. It cut its main policy rate 
to 0.25 p.c. on 8 July, but, as the difference between the interest rates for the 
marginal lending facility and the deposit facility was kept constant, the interest 
rate for the deposit facility was lowered to –0.25 p.c.
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an over-accommodating policy fuels inﬂ  ation and / or the 
development of a bubble. At a later stage, the bursting of 
the bubble may then present major challenges for policy, 
and perhaps even deﬂ  ation risks. A type 1 error is gener-
ally regarded as worse, owing to the considerable costs in 
terms of prosperity resulting from a period of deﬂ  ation. 
Therefore, type 2 errors can be regarded as payment of 
an insurance premium against type 1 errors. However, in 
some cases the cost of that insurance premium may be 
very high, because type 2 errors can also have substan-
tial implications. In retrospect, it could be argued that 
monetary policy in the United States in 2003-2004 over-
estimated the risk of deﬂ  ation so that the policy pursued 
was too expansionary, and may have contributed to the 
development of a bubble on the housing and credit mar-
kets. The bursting of that bubble was in turn among the 
reasons for the current economic problems.
This makes it more complicated to conduct policy, not 
least when it comes to following the advice : “prevention 
is better than cure”.
An outline of the monetary policy pursued from 
September 2008 
In September 2008, when the ﬁ  nancial turbulence devel-
oped into a full-blown ﬁ  nancial and economic crisis with 
a signiﬁ  cant impact on the real economy, all the leading 
central banks decided to make substantial cuts in their 
key interest rates, taking account of the downward pres-
sure on inﬂ  ation. At the beginning of October, the ﬁ  rst 
cuts were coordinated ; thereafter, the respective central 
banks reduced their key interest rates as the negative 
demand shock intensiﬁ  ed and the (expected) pressure on 
prices weakened. The cumulative interest rate cuts in the 
individual countries and their rapid succession indicate 
that all central banks opted for a very marked easing 
of monetary policy in order to achieve their respective 
goals and thus reduce the risk of deﬂ  ation. The differ-
ences between the respective economies in terms of 
key interest rate responses are generally greater than 
the differences in money market rates, which are more 
relevant for transmission to the economy. For instance, 
the British key interest rate is well below that in the euro 
area. However, the three-month Euribor is at roughly the 
same level as the three-month Libor. If the euro area is 
compared with the US, the difference is also smaller for 
the three-month money market rate than for the key 
interest rate.
Since the eruption of the ﬁ   nancial crisis, most central 
banks have supplemented these sharp interest rate cuts 
with unconventional measures. Some of them, such as 
the provision of liquidity for the purpose of safeguarding 
ﬁ   nancial stability, were implemented regardless of the 
level of the key interest rate. However, other measures 
were explicitly designed to ensure further easing of mon-
etary policy. In practice, this means that the central bank 
tries to steer the real market interest rates – possibly even 
the longer-term rate – downwards by inﬂ  uencing spreads 
or by maintaining or creating sufﬁ  ciently positive inﬂ  ation 
expectations. Below is a brief outline of these unconven-
tional measures, though it does not aim to be exhaustive 
since that would be beyond the scope of this article. It 
seems useful here to divide them into six main categories, 
CHART 8  COMPLEXITY OF CONDUCTING POLICY IN “REAL TIME”
Perception by policy-makers
Risk of deflation No risk of deflation
Good policy : prevention
is better than cure,
effectively prevents deflation
Type 1 error : deflation occurs
because of (erroneous) lack
of preventive measures
Type 2 error : prevention
is better than cure leads
to inflation and/or a bubble
Good policy :
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but in the literature slightly different classiﬁ  cations  are 
sometimes used.
Since the start of the ﬁ  nancial turbulence in July 2007, vir-
tually all central banks began by stepping up the provision 
of liquidity. To that end, a wider range of counterparties 
were admitted to the reﬁ  nancing transactions, the respec-
tive central banks provided liquidity in foreign currencies, 
and  /  or adjustments were made to the way in which 
the requested liquidity was allocated. In addition, most 
central banks increasingly provided longer-term liquidity, 
and the eligible collateral was expanded. This more ample 
provision of liquidity was intended mainly to ensure that 
liquidity shortages in individual institutions, in the event 
of a non-functional interbank market, were not converted 
into solvency risks, increasing the systemic risk. They also 
reduced the uncertainty over the borrowing requirements 
of the ﬁ  nancial institutions, and helped to compensate 
for the lower money and credit multipliers, possibly with 
a supporting effect on the lending of these institutions. 
Thus, apart from a pure ﬁ  nancial stability motive, there 
was also to some degree an inherent monetary policy 
aspect.
Quantitative easing, for its part, focuses on the liabilities 
side of the central bank balance sheet, and in particular 
on the banks’ reserves. The deliberate expansion of banks’ 
reserves via open market operations, e.g. by the purchase 
of government paper, should in principle lead to more 
lending and the holding of riskier assets, and should 
maintain or revive sufﬁ  ciently high inﬂ  ation expectations. 
Only the Bank of Japan has explicitly applied quantitative 
easing in recent times, namely between March 2001 and 
March 2006. Despite the fact that base money grew by 
around 70 p.c. during that period, the effect on inﬂ  ation 
expectations was negligible. Svensson (2009) attributes 
this to a central bank’s inability to create the credible 
expectation of a permanent expansion of the money 
supply and thus have a positive effect on the expected 
price level, as there is nothing to prevent the central bank 
from cutting the money supply back in the future. Many 
of the measures taken nowadays – such as more ample 
provision of liquidity – in practice lead to an expansion 
of the central bank balance sheet and in many cases also 
to an increase in the quantity of base money, but are 
nevertheless not, or at least not so explicitly, classed as 
quantitative easing because they focus more on the assets 
side of the central bank balance sheet. Moreover, in the 
speciﬁ  c case of the Eurosystem, it should be noted that 
there is no target at all for the volume of reserves or base 
money – an essential feature of quantitative easing –, 
since the volume of the reserves held by banks with the 
Eurosystem is driven entirely by demand from the banks, 
and not actively steered towards a particular level by the 
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Eurosystem. The unconventional measures taken by the 
Eurosystem are discussed in more detail in box 3.
The measures focusing on the assets side of the central 
bank balance sheet are often referred to as credit easing, 
a term which was ﬁ  rst used by Bernanke (2009). In the 
case of credit easing, the emphasis is more on the quali-
tative changes to the central bank balance sheet, rather 
than simply the fact that most of these measures also 
lead to its enlargement. Credit easing generally refers to 
the purchase of assets such as debt instruments issued 
by the private sector or the government, where the main 
aim is to create more favourable ﬁ  nancing conditions in 
the economy and/or to restore the operation of certain 
credit market segments which were hard hit by the crisis. 
While the purchase of private sector debt instruments is 
intended mainly to ensure liquidity on a particular market 
segment and exert downward pressure on the spreads 
for those assets, the purchase of government paper is 
designed to ﬂ  atten the (risk-free) yield curve. Both con-
tribute to a reduction in spreads and the maintenance 
or creation of positive inﬂ  ation expectations, so that real 
ﬁ  nancing conditions remain sufﬁ  ciently expansionary. The 
latest unconventional monetary policy measures approved 
by the ECB Governing Council at its meetings on 7 May 
and 4 June also fall into this category.
Another way of ﬂ  attening the yield curve is to offer infor-
mation on the future interest rate path, and more spe-
ciﬁ  cally by making an announcement, as soon as the key 
interest rate has reached its lower limit, stating that it will 
remain at a very low level for a long period. Some central 
banks, such as the Swedish and the Norwegian Central 
Bank, systematically publish their future interest rate path, 
even under more normal conditions. However, the big 
central banks do not do that. The Federal Reserve alone 
announced in December 2008, after it had reduced its key 
interest rate to 0.25 p.c., that it would maintain that rate 
at a very low level “for some time”. 
In an open economy, a policy aimed at exchange rate 
depreciation may ease monetary conditions and help to 
create positive inﬂ  ation expectations  (1). Up to now, only 
the Swiss central bank has opted for such a policy, namely 
by announcing on 12 March this year that it would coun-
teract any further appreciation of the Swiss franc against 
the euro. It is not by chance that the central bank in 
question is that of a small, open economy. Of course, in 
view of the synchronised, global character of the current 
crisis, this instrument can hardly be viewed as efﬁ  cient, 
because it is not possible for all currencies to depreciate 
at the same time. Moreover, such a policy can be seen as 
exporting domestic problems (“beggar thy neighbour”) 
and therefore unleashing a protectionist backlash, which 
can only exacerbate the crisis.
Finally, the literature often says that aiming at a clear 
target for the price level, rather than for annual inﬂ  ation, 
can provide better protection for the economy against 
a deﬂ  ationary spiral. If such a target for the future price 
level is credible, then a fall in today’s price level caused by 
a strong negative demand shock automatically implies an 
increase in inﬂ  ation expectations, generating downward 
pressure on the real interest rate. In that way, an automatic 
stabiliser is triggered. Aiming at a target for the price level 
is equivalent to aiming at a target for average inﬂ  ation cal-
culated over a fairly long period, such as ﬁ  ve years. While 
(1)  Some economists claim that this is the most efﬁ  cient way of creating positive 
inﬂ  ation expectations (Svensson, 2009).
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the greater stabilisation potential of such a strategy is clear 
from model simulations, it has not yet been applied by any 
of the large central banks. Moreover, Walsh (2009) argues 
that it seems unadvisable to switch to price-level targeting 
in a crisis. One of the reasons is that, if this switch is made 
when deﬂ  ation becomes a threat, the new strategy will 
presumably lack the necessary credibility.
The degree to which the various central banks have gone 
down the road of unconventional measures, and the 
type of measures chosen, depend on various factors. It 
is beyond the scope of this article to describe them all, 
so we conﬁ  ne ourselves here to brieﬂ  y listing the most 
important. Of course, the macroeconomic situation of 
the respective national economies is one of the principal 
determinants, and it can be assumed that a higher risk 
of deﬂ  ation generally leads to a more pronounced mon-
etary policy response. The structural characteristics of 
the various economies also have an inﬂ  uence, primarily 
on the choice of measures. For instance, up to now the 
Eurosystem has made exclusive use of the bank transmis-
sion channel, precisely because the euro area economy is 
ﬁ  nanced mainly via the banks. In contrast, in the United 
States and in the United Kingdom, monetary policy 
focused relatively more on certain ﬁ  nancial market seg-
ments, because direct ﬁ  nancing of the economy via the 
market is far more signiﬁ  cant there. Finally, policy-makers’ 
preferences may vary, especially in regard to avoiding 
type 1 and type 2 errors respectively, and that may have 
had an impact on the policies eventually chosen.
Box 3 –   The Eurosystem’s unconventional monetary policy measures
As soon as the ﬁ  nancial crisis worsened in September 2008, the Eurosystem took a series of unconventional policy 
measures which are still in force today. Since 15 October, liquidity has been provided at a ﬁ  xed rate of interest with 
full allotment, so that the banks’ demand for reserves is accommodated in full. In addition, a larger percentage 
of the liquidity is provided over a fairly long term. To that end, reﬁ  nancing operations with terms of one reserve 
maintenance period (roughly one month) and six months were introduced, in addition to the existing long-term 
operations with a maturity of three months. Furthermore, the banks can obtain liquidity from the Eurosystem in US 
dollars and in Swiss francs, while euros are made available to a number of other central banks in order to enable 
them to provide their counterparties with liquidity in euros. Finally, in view of the strong expansion of the provision 
of liquidity, the list of eligible collateral was temporarily extended. In the case of most of these measures, it was 
also announced at an early stage that they would remain in force at least until the end of 2009.
One of the main implications of these measures was the creation of a liquidity surplus at the level of the 
consolidated banking sector, a surplus which was stored at a penalty interest rate in the Eurosystem’s deposit 
facility. This generated strong downward pressure on the overnight interest rate. Thus, during that period, the 
EONIA deviated signiﬁ  cantly from the central policy rate, while the provision of liquidity had previously been 
intended speciﬁ  cally to keep the EONIA stable at close to that rate. This made it possible to neutralise part of the 
increased premiums in the term interest rates in the non-guaranteed segment of the money market, which are the 
relevant ones for the transmission of monetary policy.
In the light of the persistent downside risks to price stability, the ECB Governing Council decided on three 
supplementary measures on 7 May and 4 June.
First, the European Investment Bank (EIB) was recognised as an eligible counterparty for the Eurosystem’s 
reﬁ   nancing operations. The ultimate aim of this measure is to support lending to small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), because this measure should help the EIB to satisfy additional demand for loans totalling an 
estimated 10 billion, which – in view of the usual leverage in this type of loan – could lead to a total expansion of 
40 billion in the volume of lending to SMEs.
Second, it was also decided to conduct longer-term reﬁ  nancing operations with a maturity of twelve months in 
June, September and December 2009. Not only will these supplementary reﬁ  nancing operations give a further 
boost to structural liquidity, offering the banks additional comfort, but they will also help to ﬂ  atten the yield curve 

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on the money market. These operations are also conducted at a ﬁ  xed rate with full allotment. While it was decided 
to conduct the June and September operations at the key policy rate, which then stood at 1 p.c., a premium 
may be added to the prevailing key interest rate at the time of the December operation. To maintain consistency 
between the various measures, it was also decided to extend the list of eligible collateral until December 2010, 
precisely the month in which the December 2009 twelve-month reﬁ  nancing operation will mature.
Third, it was decided to buy a portfolio of covered bonds for the sum of 60 billion. These purchases will be 
spread over the period July 2009 – June 2010 and will be conducted on both the primary and the secondary 
market. There are two reasons for speciﬁ  cally choosing covered bonds. First, these bonds are issued mainly by 
banks. By increasing liquidity in this market segment, which was hard hit by the ﬁ  nancial crisis, and lowering the 
spreads in relation to the risk-free interest rate, an attempt is therefore being made to improve the long-term 
ﬁ  nancing of the banks and thus support lending to the non-bank sector. Furthermore, the banking sector is also 
the main holder of covered bonds, so that the purchases on the secondary market will also provide additional 
liquidity for the banks, or at least enable them to reduce their leverage without squeezing the volume of lending 
to households and businesses. Thus, the supplementary easing of monetary policy is still clearly aimed at the 
bank transmission channel, which is important for the euro area. Second, covered bonds have a low risk proﬁ  le, 
because the holder has a dual claim : a claim on the issuer of the covered bond (often a bank) and – if the issuer 
defaults – a claim on a pool of underlying assets (often mortgage loans or loans to the government) which the 
issuer must hold in order to cover the bond. This ensures that the risk incurred by the Eurosystem in buying these 
instruments remains manageable.
Conclusions
Since September 2008, in both the euro area and most 
developed economies, there have been unmistakeable 
signs of an increased ex ante risk of bad deﬂ  ation. In the 
past, a negative demand shock which originates partly 
from, but is also reinforced by, a ﬁ  nancial crisis and which 
is preceded by the bursting of a bubble affecting various 
asset prices has quite often led to deﬂ  ation.  However, 
prompt, accurate assessment of this increased risk of 
deﬂ  ation has led the policy-makers to conduct a decid-
edly expansionary policy. The measures to support the 
banks, the recovery plans of the various governments, and 
the interest rate cuts supplemented by unconventional 
measures on the part of central banks throughout the 
world have signiﬁ  cantly reduced the deﬂ  ation risk.  Such 
a resolute policy response is in stark contrast to what 
happened at the time of the Great Depression. This has 
ensured that inﬂ  ation expectations remain positive and to 
a large extent anchored. In that regard, the analysis has 
focused on the euro area (and where possible on Belgium) 
and shown that the current situation of (slightly) nega-
tive inﬂ  ation will in all probability be short-lived. Low but 
nonetheless deﬁ  nitely positive inﬂ  ation is then likely to 
ensue. The baseline scenario therefore does not assume 
deﬂ  ation and recently indicators have increasingly become 
available showing that the freefall of the economy has 
come to a standstill.
Yet monetary policy faces two major challenges for the 
immediate future.
First, it is absolutely essential to ensure that the price falls 
reﬂ  ected in the inﬂ  ation ﬁ  gures for the summer months 
are not incorporated in expectations concerning the pat-
tern of the general price level, thus increasing the risk 
of a deﬂ  ationary spiral. It is therefore vital to make clear 
and credible statements about the inﬂ  ation analysis. This 
article has attempted to make a contribution here. More 
particularly, it stresses that the sharp fall in inﬂ  ation during 
recent months does not point to bad deﬂ  ation, but to 
negative inﬂ   ation resulting from relative price adjust-
ments, and that there are no widespread price reductions 
taking place at present. This sharp fall, resulting in nega-
tive values during the summer of 2009, is due mainly to 
the decline in the crude oil price at the end of last year, 
which in itself is a factor bolstering the purchasing power 
of the oil-importing economies, and therefore can hardly 
be seen as a mechanism triggering a bad deﬂ  ationary 
spiral. The Eurosystem’s monetary policy strategy com-
prises all the ingredients for addressing this communica-
tion challenge. The quantitative deﬁ  nition of price stability 
does not only provide a clear anchor for inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions. Its explicit medium-term orientation also indicates 
that temporary deviations from the inﬂ  ation level corre-
sponding to price stability – in either direction – are less 
relevant from the point of view of monetary policy.
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Second, monetary policy must remain vigilant in order to 
avoid the type 1 and type 2 errors described in this article, 
as there is unusually great uncertainty over the macro-
economic outlook at present, including inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions in both the short and medium term. 
On the one hand, it is not possible to state with any 
certainty that the deﬂ  ation  risk  has  deﬁ  nitely  faded, 
since there are still risks of a contraction in activity. More 
speciﬁ  cally, there is still a possibility that, following an 
initial recovery, the economy will contract again once 
the – in principle short-term – support provided by the 
rebuilding of stocks and the ﬁ  scal policy stimuli ceases 
to apply, or that the recovery takes longer than expected 
to materialise, e.g. owing to persistent problems in the 
banking sector. In both cases, there will be additional 
downward pressure on inﬂ  ation, and further monetary 
policy easing may be desirable. In this connection, the 
ECB Governing Council has indicated that the key inter-
est rate, at 1 p.c., has not necessarily reached its lowest 
level, although during the summer months that level 
was deemed appropriate in view of the general macro-
economic situation. 
On the other hand, there is also the risk that the massive 
monetary stimuli of recent months may not be removed 
sufﬁ   ciently promptly, certainly if the economy picks up 
faster than expected. The change of direction evident in 
most economic indicators and commodity prices in recent 
months naturally requires close monitoring in this respect.
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